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Abstract:  Historical sciences like evolutionary biology reconstruct past events by 
using the traces that the past has bequeathed to the present.  The Markov Chain 
Convergence Theorem and the Data Processing Inequality describe how the mutual 
information between present and past is affected by how much time there is in 
between.  These two results are very general; they pertain to any process, not just 
to the biological processes that occur in evolution.  To study the specifically 
biological question of how the present state of a lineage provides information 
about its evolutionary past, we use a Moran process framework and consider how 
the kind of evolutionary process (drift, and selection of various kinds) at work in a 
lineage affects the epistemological relation of present to past. 
 
 What is the epistemic relation of present to past?  Absent a time machine, we 
are trapped in the present and must rely on present traces to learn about the past.  
There are memory traces inside the skull, but outside there are tree rings, fossils, 
and traces of other kinds.  People use these traces to reconstruct the past.  
Sometimes they simply assume that the traces provide unerring information about 
the past, but often they realize that the jump from present to past is subject to error.  
A bevy of epistemic concepts can be pressed into service to investigate the relation 
of present traces to past events, ranging from strong concepts like knowledge and 
certainty to more modest ones like justified belief and evidence. 
 We are interested in how the natural processes connecting past to present 
constrain our ability to know about the past by looking at the traces found in the 
present.  An optimistic view of these processes is that the past is potentially an 
open book; all we need do is understand the connecting processes correctly and 
look around for the right traces.  If the relation of the past state of a system to its 
present state were deterministic and one-to-one, this optimistic view would be 
correct.  If only we could know the present state with sufficient precision, and if 
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only we could grasp the true mapping function that connects present and past, we 
would be home free.  This optimism is something that Laplace (1814, p. 4) 
affirmed when he discussed une intelligence (now referred to as “a demon”): 
 We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and 
 the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know 
 all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which 
 nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these 
 data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the 
 greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an 
 intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would 
 be present before its eyes. 
It is worth noting that determinism is not sufficient for the optimistic view to be 
true; without the one-to-one assumption, distinct states of the past may map onto 
the same state of the present, with the consequence that the exact state of the past 
cannot be retrieved from even a perfectly precise grasp of the present state. 
 Is determinism necessary for the optimistic view to be true?  It is not, 
provided that we set to one side strong concepts like knowledge and certainty and 
take up an epistemic evaluation that is more modest.  Consider, for example, a 
process in which the system is, at each moment, in one of two states (coded 0 and 
1).  Suppose Past=0 makes Present=0 extremely probable (say, 0.96) and that 
Past=1 makes Present=1 extremely probable as well (say, 0.98).  This means that 
when we observe the system’s present state, we gain strong evidence that 
discriminates between the two hypotheses Past=0 and Past=1.  We can’t infer from 
Present=0 that the past state was certainly 0; in fact, we can’t even infer that the 
past state was probably 0.   But we can conclude that the observation favors the 
hypothesis that Past=0 over the hypothesis that Past=1.  This conclusion is licensed 
by what Hacking (1965) calls the Law of Likelihood: 
 Observation O favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 if and only if 
 Pr(O│H1) > Pr(O│H2). 
       
Royall (2007) suggests that this qualitative principle should be supplemented by a 
quantitative measure of favoring: 
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 The degree to which O favors H1 over H2 is given by the 
          likelihood ratio . 
Royall further suggests that a reasonable convention for separating strong evidence 
from weak is a ratio of 8.  If we adopt Royall’s suggestion, we must conclude that 
the probabilistic process just described entails that Present=0 provides strong 
evidence favoring Past=0 over Past=1, since the likelihood ratio is  = 48.     
 This simple example should not be over-interpreted.  If there were a process 
connecting past to present in the way described, the present would provide strong 
evidence about the past.  Do not forget the if.  Perhaps there are such processes, 
especially when the past we are talking about is the recent past.  But what if we 
consider not just the recent past, but past times that are more and more ancient?  
How does increasing the temporal separation between present and past affect the 
amount of information that the present provides about the past? 
 
Two classic theorems 
 The Markov Chain Convergence Theorem provides an answer to the 
question just posed (Cover and Thomas 2006).  Consider a system that at any time 
is in one of n possible states (s1, s2, …, sn).  For simplicity we’ll think of the system 
as evolving in discrete time steps.  We stipulate that the system has the following 
four properties: 
(constant transition probabilities) There is a fixed set of transition probabilities; 
these describe the system’s probability of being in state si at time t+1, given that it 
was in state sj at time t (for all i,j).  These transition probabilities are constants; 
they do not change values as the system evolves.  
(irreducibility) For any two states, each is accessible from the other, in the sense 
that there is a chain that goes from each eventually to the other where each change 
in the chain has nonzero probability.  It needn’t be possible to move directly from 
each state to every other in a single jump.    
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(aperiodicity) This is delicate to state in full generality; see Häggström (2002) for 
details.  For present purposes, we state a sufficient condition:  For any state that the 
system is in, it’s possible that it remains in that state at the next time step.   
(the Markov property) For any two times t1 < t2, the state of the system at t1 
screens-off the system’s history prior to t1 from the state at t2.  That is, 
       Pr(system is in state y at t2 │system is state x at t1) = 
       Pr(system is in state y at t2 │system is state x at t1  & system’s history prior to  
  t1), for all states x and y. 
For any system of this sort, the following result holds: 
 The Markov Chain Convergence Theorem:  If a system has constant 
 transition probabilities, and the system is irreducible, aperiodic, and 
 satisfies the Markov property, then I(Past, Present) approaches  zero  as the 
 time separating past and present approaches infinity. 
I(X;Y) is the “mutual information” linking the two variables.  If the variables are 
discrete, the formula for this quantity is: 
   
where p(x,y) is the joint probability that X = x and  Y = y, and p(x), p(y) are the 
(marginal) probabilities that X = x, and that Y = y, respectively. Mutual information 
measures how much (on average) you learn about the state of one of the variables 
by observing the state of the other.  Its value is zero when X and Y are independent; 
otherwise it is positive.  Mutual information is symmetrical:  I(X;Y) = I(Y;X) .  The 
decay of information described by the Markov chain convergence theorem occurs 
exponentially fast (Sober and Steel 2011, Proposition 6). 
 The convergence theorem does not insure a monotonic decline in 
information as the temporal separation of past from present is increased.  That 
extra element is provided by a different result, the so-called “Data Processing 
Inequality” (Cover and Thomas 2006): 
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 The Data Processing Inequality:  In a causal chain from a distal cause D to a 
 proximate cause P to an effect E, if P screens-off D from  E, then I(E;D) is 
 less than or equal to both I(E;P) and I(P;D). 
 
For a discrete-state process, these two inequalities are strict whenever P is neither 
perfectly correlated with D or E nor independent of them (See Appendix A).  The 
data processing inequality does not require that the process linking D to P is the 
same as the process linking P to E.  That is an additional difference between it and 
the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem. 
 The information processing inequality is “chain internal.”  It does not say 
that the present always provides more information about recent events than about 
ones that are older.  Consider Figure 1.  Suppose that R screens-off A from D1&D2.  
Then the information processing inequality says that I(D1&D2; R) ≥ I(D 1&D2;A).  
It does not say that I(D1&D2&…&D100; R) ≥ I(D1&D1&…&D100; A).  It is 
perfectly possible that the hundred descendants that now exist provide more 
information about A than they do about R.  Note that R does not screen-off A from 
D1&D2&…&D100. 
 
Figure 1:  A case in which it is possible for the present to provide more 
information about an ancient event (A) than about a more recent event (R). 
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 Both the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem and the data processing 
inequality are very general.  They characterize any system whose laws of motion 
have the requisite probabilistic features.  The system might be a chamber of gas, 
but it also might be an evolving population of organisms.   Indeed, if there were 
disembodied spirits that changed probabilistically, the results would apply to them.  
Both results are more general than physics – they cover the systems and properties 
that are discussed in the laws of physics, but they also apply to systems and 
properties that are not.  In addition, both results are a priori mathematical truths, 
though of course it is an empirical matter whether a given system satisfies the 
antecedent of the conditional that each result expresses (Sober 2011). 
 
Five Evolutionary Processes 
 Since our interest here is in how evolutionary processes affect the amount of 
information that the present provides about the past, it is worth making clear how 
the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem applies to models of biological 
evolution.  Moran (1962) models of evolution will be our work horse in what 
follows.  We consider a population containing N individuals.  The population 
evolves through a sequence of discrete temporal “moments” (how long a moment 
is won’t matter).  At each moment, one of those N individuals produces a copy of 
itself and one of those N individuals dies.  We consider two traits A and B; each 
individual has one of them or the other.  At any moment, the population is in one 
of N+1 states (ranging from 0% A to 100% A).  This Moran framework can be 
articulated in different ways to represent different evolutionary processes.  For 
example, if individuals are chosen at random to reproduce and die, then we have a 
drift process.  Selection processes of different kinds can be represented by letting 
A individuals have chances of dying or reproducing that differ from those 
possessed by B individuals.  A population undergoing a Moran process forms a 
Markov chain, with its recent past screening-off its more remote past from the 
present.   
 Suppose we observe the population in the present and see that all N 
individuals are in state A.  How much information does that observation provide 
about the state of the population at some earlier time?   If all states are accessible to 
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each other (which requires that mutations can prevent the population from getting 
“stuck” at 100% A or 100% B), then the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem 
applies and so the mutual information asymptotes to zero with time.  However, if 
there is no mutation, then the population will evolve to either 100% A or 100% B 
and will stay there.  In this case, the present state of the population provides 
information about its past even if the two are infinitely separated.  For example, if 
we observe that the population is now 100% A and the population has been 
evolving by drift, this observation favors the hypothesis that the population was 
100% A at some earlier time over the hypothesis that it was 5% A, even if present 
and past are infinitely separated.           
  John Maynard Keynes (1924, ch. 3) once said that “in the long run, we are 
all dead.”  His point was to pooh-pooh the relevance of claims about the infinite 
long run.  What should matter to us mortals is finite time.  This point applies to the 
bearing of the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem on our knowledge of the 
evolutionary past.  Who cares if mutual information goes to zero as the time 
separating present from past goes to infinity?  Life on earth is a mere 3.8 billion 
years old.  What is relevant is that information decays monotonically in Markov 
chains.  But in addition, we know that there are different kinds of evolutionary 
process.  Which of these speeds the loss of information and which slows it?   
 The five processes we want to investigate are represented in Figure 2; each 
of them can result in our present observation that all N of the individuals in the 
population now have trait A.  In (i), trait A reached 100% representation because it 
was favored by selection.  In (iii), 100% A evolved in spite of the fact that there 
was selection against it.  In (ii) the traits are equal in fitness, so the population 
drifted to 100% A.  In (iv), selection favored the majority trait.  And in (v), 
selection favored the minority trait.  We are not asking which of these process 
hypotheses is most plausible, given the observed state of the population at present.  
Rather, we want to explore what happens to information loss under each of these 
five scenarios, in each case thinking of the process in the context of the Moran 
framework of a finite population of fixed size N. 
 
 
8 
 
Figure 2:  Five processes that can result in all N of the individuals now in the 
population having trait A. 
 
 
 
 
                            A 
      Fitness                                                                                     A,B 
                            B 
 
     
                     0                                       N                             0                                      N 
                           # of A individuals                                            # of A individuals 
                                       (i)                                                                      (ii)  
 
 
 
                             B                                                                                            A 
 
                             A                                                                                                B 
  
 
                     0                                       N                             0                                       N 
                           # of A individuals                                            # of A individuals 
                                     (iii)                                                                   (iv)   
 
     
                                                      
                                                                                           B 
 
                                                                                                 A 
 
                             
                                          0                                      N   
                                                 # of A individuals     
                                                                                (v)      
  
 
 
9 
 
 To compare the five processes in this respect, we calculate the following 
likelihood ratio for each of them: 
 
   , for i>j. 
 
The observation is that all N of the individuals now in the population have trait A.  
Does this observation favor the hypothesis that there were exactly i individuals at 
some past time who had trait A over the hypothesis that there were exactly j, where 
i>j?  It does; Rij > 1 for each of the five processes we are considering (see 
Appendix B).   Our question is how the magnitude of Rij depends on the underlying 
evolutionary process.   
  We begin by adopting an assumption that we treated above with Keynesian 
disdain.  Let’s assume that the temporal separation of past and present is infinite 
and that there is zero mutation.  For each of the processes we’re considering, we  
now can describe what the value of Rij is for each pair of values for i and j such that 
i>j.  For example, under neutral evolution the value of Rij is .  The values for the 
other four processes are given in the Appendix B.  The ordering of the Rij values 
for the five processes is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  Comparing Rij values for five processes, assuming infinite temporal 
separation of Past from Present and zero mutation. 
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  Let’s first consider three of the cases described in Figure 3 -- drift and the 
two cases of frequency independent selection.   The ordering of Rij values for these 
three processes means that the observation that all the individuals in the population 
now have trait A provides more information about the past state of the population 
the less probable it was that A would evolve to fixation.  Selection for A is at the 
bottom of the pile, with neutrality next, and selection against A at the top.  This 
result echoes an insight that Darwin expresses in the Origin: 
… adaptive characters, although of the utmost importance to the welfare of 
the being, are almost valueless to the systematist.  For animals belonging to 
two most distinct lines of descent, may readily become adapted to similar 
conditions, and thus assume a close external resemblance; but such 
resemblances will not reveal – will rather tend to conceal their blood-
relationship to their proper lines of descent (Darwin 1859, p. 427). 
Darwin illustrates this idea by giving an example:  whales and fish both have fins, 
but this isn’t strong evidence for their common ancestry, since the trait is an 
adaptation for swimming through water.  Far stronger evidence for common 
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ancestry is provided by similarities that are useless or deleterious.  This idea is so 
important to Darwin’s reasoning that one of us has called it “Darwin’s Principle” 
(Sober 2011). Darwin’s topic in the passage quoted is inferring common ancestry, 
not inferring the past state of a lineage from its present state, but the epistemology 
is the same.   
 There are two cases of frequency dependent selection represented in Figure 
3.  One of them (frequency dependent selection for the majority trait) shows that it 
would be an over-statement to say that the current state of the population (all 
individuals having trait A) provides little evidence concerning the population’s 
past state if trait A evolved because of natural selection.  It matters a great deal 
what sort of selection process we’re talking about.  Frequency dependent selection 
for the majority trait is better than drift as far as the information harvest is 
concerned.  Figure 3 also locates the evidential meaning of frequency dependent 
selection for the minority trait; it has an informational yield that is worse than that 
provided by drift.  As noted in the Appendix, our results for both cases of 
frequency dependent selection require the assumption that j < N/2. 
 Figure 3 provides only a partial ordering of the five cases depicted.  The 
reason for this is that a comparison of, say, frequency independent selection 
against A with frequency dependent selection for the majority trait would depend 
on the values of specific parameters. 
 We now can remove the idealization of infinite time and zero mutation.   
The ordering of the Rij’s for the five processes, when time is infinite and mutation 
is zero, is the same as the ordering of those processes for the following slightly 
different likelihood ratio, when time is finite (and sufficiently large) and there is a 
sufficiently small mutational input: 
     
(see Appendix C). Here ‘Past ≈ N’ and  ‘Past ≈ 0’ just mean any state close to N, 
and to 0 (respectively), which are then held fixed across the five models.  With 
mutational input, the Markov Chain Convergence Theorem applies to all five 
processes. The mutual information between present and past declines 
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monotonically as their temporal separation increases, but the decline is faster under 
some processes than it is under others. 
 Our results are derived within the setting of the Moran model of population 
genetics. This is a finite-state Markov chain that forms a ‘continuant process’ 
(Ewens 2010).  That is, at each step the number of individuals carrying a particular 
allele in the population of fixed size N either goes up by 1, or down by 1, or it stays 
the same.  We would expect similar conclusions concerning the partial order of the 
Rij ratios for other continuant processes, provided the transition probabilities 
faithfully reflect the various types of selection being compared. 
 We have emphasized that loss of information within a lineage is a fact of 
life.  However, the branching that takes place in evolution is a force that pushes in 
the opposite direction, since it creates new lineages.  As illustrated in Figure 1, it is 
possible for ancient ancestors to have more present day descendants than more 
recent ancestors do, and this means that the information lost to the passage of time 
can be offset by the proliferation of descendants that each bear witness to the 
ancient ancestor’s state.  If the process is a symmetric one on two states it is 
possible to describe precisely how often branching must occur if information loss 
is to be offset in this way (Evans et al. 2000); for more general processes, we must 
usually be content with upper and lower bounds. 
 It might be asked why we need to worry about observing live organisms to 
infer the characteristics of their ancestors.  Doesn’t observing fossils provide a 
simpler and more definitive solution?  Our answer has three parts.  First, one can’t 
assume that a fossil comes from an ancestor of extant species; it may just be an 
ancient relative.  Second, fossils provide evidence about the morphological hard 
parts of ancient organisms; molecular characters, not to mention phenotypic 
features of physiology and behavior, typically do not fossilize.  And finally, fossil 
traces degrade and are subject to the Markov chain convergence theorem if their 
probabilistic laws of motion take the relevant form. 
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The Impact of Branching on Information 
  
Figure 4:  Does observing the four leaves of the star phylogeny (i) provide more 
information about the state of the root than observing the four leaves of the 
bifurcating phylogeny (ii)?  
 
                   D1       D2       D3       D4                  D1       D2        D3       D4 
 
 
 
                                 A=?                                                 A=? 
(i)                                                    (ii) 
  
 Just as the process at work in lineages has an impact on information loss, so 
too does the topology of the branching process itself.  It might seem intuitive to 
conjecture that the star phylogeny shown in Figure 4i is “better” than the 
bifurcating topology shown in Figure 4ii in the sense that the former topology 
allows the observations to provide more information about the root than the latter 
topology does.  In order to hold other factors fixed, we assume that the two 
topologies have the same number of leaves and that the process at work in 
branches is the same in the two topologies (in particular, the expected number of 
substitutions (branch lengths) between the root and each leaf match up for the two 
trees). The conjecture just stated seems reasonable, since in Figure 4i the 
observations are independent of each other, conditional on the state of the root, 
whereas in 4b, the observations are not conditionally independent.  The guess is 
correct for a two-state symmetrical process when we compare the two trees in 
Figure 4 (Sober 1989, p. 280). More generally, this guess holds whenever we 
compare any binary tree with a star phylogeny on the same number of leaves when 
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a two-state symmetric process is at work (Evans et al. 2000). But, surprisingly, it 
isn’t true for every symmetric Markov processes on five or more states when the 
substitution rate lies in a certain region and the two trees have the same 
(sufficiently large) number of leaves (Sly 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
  In summary, a simplistic view of evolution as an “information-destroying 
process” overlooks some tantalizing details.  For some special processes (e.g. zero 
mutation in simple population genetic models), information never completely 
disappears, even after infinite time. At the other extreme there are certain (discrete 
time) processes for which the information can collapse completely to zero in finite 
time (Mossel, 1998; Sober and Steel, 2011, p.233).  The more usual situation lies 
between these two extremes; for processes subject to the Markov chain 
convergence theorem, the information between past and present decays at an 
exponential rate and vanishes only in the limit.  Here we can still compare the 
relative support such models provide in estimating an ancestral state from an 
observation today.   For the five models considered, this support varies in a 
predictable way depending on the type of model assumed. Moreover, the 
estimation of an ancestral state from the leaves of a phylogenetic tree exhibits 
further subtleties, along with a surprise: the independent estimates obtained from a 
star phylogeny may or may not be more informative than correlated estimates 
obtained from a binary tree, depending on the number of states, the size of the tree, 
and the substitution rate. 
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Appendix A 
 
Proposition 1.1  Suppose that ZYX →→  forms a Markov chain, where the state spaces for YX ,  and 
Z  are discrete, and where and  for all choices of states 
zyx ,,  for ZYX ,,  respectively.  Then the Data Processing Inequality is an equality if and only if YX ,  
and Z  are mutually independent. 
Proof. First, if ZYX ,,  are mutually independent then they are pairwise independent and so 
0=);(=);(=);( ZYIZXIYXI  and thus equality holds trivially.  Next, suppose that 
 and for all choices of states zyx ,,  for ZYX ,,  
respectively. Then  holds also (since ZYX →→  is Markov chain). 
Suppose further that the DPI is an equality; we will show that YX ,  and Z  are independent. Since the 
DPI is an equality, ZYX →→  and YZX →→  are both Markov chains (Cover and Thomas, 2006). 
We write )(xyzp  as short-hand for the probability  and similarly for 
conditional and marginal probabilities (thus e.g. ). First observe that the 
positivity condition 0>)(xyzp  for all ),,( zyx  implies that )(),(),(),(),(),( zpypxpyzpxzpxyp  are 
also strictly positive. Since ZYX →→  is a Markov chain, and 0>)(xyp :  
 ),()|(=)()|(=)( xypyzpxypxyzpxyzp  (1) 
 and since YZX →→  is also a Markov chain, and 0>)(xzp , we have:  
).()|(=)()|(=)( xzpzypxzpxzypxyzp   Applying Bayes' theorem the last term can be written as 
)(
)(
)()|( xzp
zp
ypyzp
 (note that 0>)(zp ) and so, combining this with Eqn. (1) gives:  
 ),(
)(
)()|(=)()|(=)( xzp
zp
ypyzpxypyzpxyzp  
and so:  
 ).()()|(=)()()|( xzpypyzpzpxypyzp  (2) 
18 
 
 Since 0>)|( yzp  (because 0>)(yzp ) we can cancel this term on the left and right of Eqn. (2) to 
obtain:  
 ).()(=)()( xzpypzpxyp  (3) 
 Now, we can further write )()|(=)( ypyxpxyp  and )()|(=)( zpzxpxzp  which, upon substitution 
Eqn. (3) gives:  
 ),()|()(=)()()|( zpzxpypzpypyxp  
in other words: )|(=)|( zxpyxp (noting that 0>)(),( zpyp ). Now, this equation must hold for all 
choices of yx,  and z  so )|( yxp  must be constant as y  varies - which implies that X  and Y  are 
independent. Similarly X  and Z  are independent. Finally, reversing the two Markov chains gives that 
Z  is independent of Y . Thus YX ,  and Z  are pairwise independent. Moreover they are independent as 
a triple since ZYX →→  is a Markov chain and so 
).()()(=)()(=)()()|(=)()|(=)( zpypxpxpyzpypxpyzpxypxyzpxyzp  
 
Appendix B:   The ijR  ratios with zero mutation at the infinite time limit 
Consider the Moran model in population genetics, with two trait values A  and B  and population size 
N . Let },{0,1, NX t ∈  be the number of copies of A  in the population at time t . In this section we 
assume zero mutation, and we consider neutral evolution, selection for A , selection against A , and 
frequency-dependent selection (for the majority state and against the majority state). Since each of these 
Markov processes has absorbing states 0 and N  (because of zero mutation) eventually one allele will be 
fixed and the other lost. Let }{0, NE∈  be this end state, and },{0,1, NS ∈  the starting state (thus 
0= XS  and tt XE lim= ∞→ ).  We are interested in comparing the ratio of conditional probabilities:  
  
for ji >  under the various models. 
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Proposition 2.1  
(i) Under neutral evolution 
j
iRij = , for all Nji ≤,<0  
(ii) Under frequency-independent selection j
i
ij c
cR
−
−
1
1= , for all Nji ≤,<0 , where c  is a positive 
constant with 1<c  when there is selection for A  and 1>c  when there is selection against A . 
 (iii) For  any two values },{1,2,, Nji ∈  with ji >  the ijR  value for selection against A  exceeds the 
ijR  value for neutral evolution, which in turn exceeds the ijR  value for selection for A . 
(iv) For frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of trait A  is proportional to its frequency, the 
associated ijR  value exceeds that for neutral evolution for all },{1,2,, Nji ∈  with ji >  provided that 
/2< Nj .  
(v) For frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of trait A  is proportional to the frequency of the 
alternative trait B , the associated ijR  value is lower than that for neutral evolution for all 
},{1,2,, Nji ∈  with ji > , provided that /2< Nj . 
(vi)  In all the cases considered above we have 1>ijR  for all ji > . 
 
 Proof:  Part (i): For any integer Nxx ≤≤0:  it is a well-known result (for many neutral models) that  
  
(see e.g. Eqn. (3.49) of Ewens (2010)), from which (i) immediately follows.  
 Part (ii):  From Ewens (2010) Eqn. (3.66) we have, for any },{1, Nx ∈ :  
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for a positive constant c  which is greater than 1 for selection against A  and less than 1 for selection for 
A . Part (ii) now follows immediately.  
 Part (iii). By parts (i) and (ii), part (iii) is equivalent to the assertions that for ji > , if (0,1)∈c  
then ,<
1
1
j
i
c
c
j
i
−
−
while if ji >  and 1>c  then .>
1
1
j
i
c
c
j
i
−
−
 
Now, using the identity ))(1(1=1 12 −++++−− kk ccccc   we have:  
 1
1
1
1=
1
1
−
−
++
++
−
−
j
i
j
i
c
c
c
c


 (4) 
 and so we wish to compare 
j
iand
c
c
j
i
1
1
1
1
−
−
++
++


 which is equivalent to comparing:  
 .11
11
j
cand
i
c ji −− ++++ 
 
Now, the left-hand side is merely the average of the terms kc  from 0=k  up to 1= −ik  while the right 
hand side is the average of these terms up to 1−j  and since ji >  the left-hand side is smaller than the 
right when 1<c  and greater when 1>c . This completes the proof.  
 Part (iv):  When selection is frequency-dependent we need to use the expression: 
  (5) 
where fk and gk denote the fitnesses of the alleles A when B, respectively when k individuals have 
allele type A (see e.g. Huang and Traulsen (2010), Eqn. (6)). 
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If we now take the fitness of trait A  to be proportional to its frequency, that is  for a 
constant 0>a , and take the fitness of trait B  to also be proportional to its frequency (with the same 
coefficient) -- that is,  -- then Eqn. (5) gives:  
  (6) 
 As before, this ratio exceeds 
j
i
 precisely when the average of the first i  terms  (for 
) exceeds the average of the first j  terms . And this holds for all ji >  with 
/2< Nj . 
  Part (v):  If we take the fitness of trait A  to be proportional to the frequency of B , that is 
 for a constant 0>a , and take the fitness of trait B  to be proportional to the frequency 
of A  (with the same coefficient), so , then, by Eqn. (5),  we have: 
  (7) 
 and this ratio is lower than 
j
i
 precisely when the average of the first i  terms  (for 
) is lower than the average of the first j  terms . This holds for all ji >  with 
/2< Nj . 
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 Part (vi):  The inequality 1>ijR  for ji >  is trivial for neutral evolution, while for the other 
processes the inequality follows from Eqns. (5), (6) and (7), noting that when ji >  the i  terms in the 
numerator include the j  terms in the denominator along with some additional positive terms. 
 
 
Appendix C:   The ijR  ratios at finite time and nonzero mutation rate 
 
The results in the previous section assume zero mutation and consider the infinite time limit. However 
they also have some bearing on what happens at finite time, and for non-zero mutation. First assume zero 
mutation, and consider the ratio ijR  at finite times t . Since these ratios are continuous functions of t  and 
converge to values that satisfy the partial order described in Figure 3, this ordering also holds for t  
sufficiently large (but finite). Select any such sufficiently value 0t  of t , and consider this ratio ijR  at 0t  
as a function of the mutation rates. Again, ijR  is a continuous function of these mutation rates (with t  
fixed to 0t ) and so, for sufficiently small (but non-zero) mutation rates, the five ijR  values will still be 
ordered as in Figure 3 at 0t .   
 
 
 
